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Abstract
Research on sex differences in empathy has revealed mixed findings. Whereas experimen-
tal and neuropsychological measures show no consistent sex effect, self-report data consis-
tently indicates greater empathy in women. However, available results mainly come from
separate populations with relatively small samples, which may inflate effect sizes and hinder
comparability between both empirical corpora. To elucidate the issue, we conducted two
large-scale studies. First, we examined whether sex differences emerge in a large popula-
tion-based sample (n = 10,802) when empathy is measured with an experimental empathy-
for-pain paradigm. Moreover, we investigated the relationship between empathy and moral
judgment. In the second study, a subsample (n = 334) completed a self-report empathy
questionnaire. Results showed some sex differences in the experimental paradigm, but with
minuscule effect sizes. Conversely, women did portray themselves as more empathic
through self-reports. In addition, utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas were less frequent
in women, although these differences also had small effect sizes. These findings suggest
that sex differences in empathy are highly driven by the assessment measure. In particular,
self-reports may induce biases leading individuals to assume gender-role stereotypes.
Awareness of the role of measurement instruments in this field may hone our understanding
of the links between empathy, sex differences, and gender roles.
Introduction
“Boys will be boys”, “girls are emotional and sensitive”, “men don’t cry, women do”. These and
other gender stereotypes have perpetuated the notion that women are more empathetic and caring
than men. Throughout, the term “gender” is used to refer to “the attitudes, feelings, and behaviors
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that a given culture associates with a person’s biological sex”[1], while the term “sex” refers to a
person’s biological status [1]. Supporting evidence for gender stereotypes has been obtained
through self-report empathy questionnaires [2–5], which may be strongly biased by gender-rele-
vant social expectations [6, 7]. Similarly, results from self-administered measures have motivated
the view that women are more care-oriented than men in moral reasoning [8, 9]. While this evi-
dence seems to reveal sex differences in both empathy and moral judgment, it stems from instru-
ments likely to bias responses towards gender-role stereotypes [7, 10, 11]. Indeed, sex differences
are typically absent in relevant experimental tasks [4, 12] and physiological measures [6, 13, 14].
Moreover, available results stem from relatively small samples, which casts doubts on both lines of
research because they may inflate effect sizes and yield inaccurate estimations of the relevance of a
significant difference. Through the present population-based study, we aimed to (a) assess whether
empathy, moral judgment, and their relationship differ between sexes; and (b) test whether previ-
ously reported empathy differences obtained though gender-role-biased instruments also emerge
on a well-validated experimental paradigm [15–19]. In particular, by analyzing data from massive
samples, we aim to go beyond p-values as indicators of significance and focus on the systematicity
of potential differences by considering truly informative effect sizes.
Previous studies on sex differences in empathy have yielded mixed results. Such differences
are stronger when empathy is measured with self-report questionnaires (e.g., [2, 3–5, 20–22]).
Sex differences favoring women were also observed through a task assessing feelings of sympa-
thy towards targets, prior to performing an empathic accuracy task [23]. Contrarily, no sex dif-
ferences emerge when empathy is assessed with experimental tasks [4, 12] or physiological
measures [6, 13, 14]. Thus, sex differences in empathy vary dramatically depending on the
method of assessment. Such inconsistencies have been further fueled by other factors. For
instance, available results stem from relatively small samples and no population-based studies
have been performed. In addition, although reporting confidence intervals is a highly desirable
practice in psychology [24], it has been overlooked in most previous studies. Most of the extant
work on sex differences in empathy has been based on formal statistical significance–typically,
a p-value less than .05. P-values alone do not permit any direct statement about the direction
or size of a difference between groups. For this purpose, confidence intervals provide informa-
tion about statistical significance, as well as the direction and strength of the effect [25]. More-
over confidence intervals help to combine evidence over experiments and give information
about precision [24]. A further caveat is that although effect sizes are considered the most
important outcome of empirical studies [26], they are absent in most available research (e.g.,
[2, 3, 4, 22, 27]). In this sense, the statistical power of psychological and neuroscientific studies
is typically undermined by the use of small samples, which leads to overestimated effect sizes
[26, 28–33]. Statistical power depends on the sample size of the study, the effect size, and the
significance criterion [26]. As the sample size increases, so does the reliability of the sample
values and the extent to which such values can be expected to provide accurate estimations of
the population’s values [26]. Consequently, larger sample sizes increase power and decrease
estimation error [34]. In addition, data from population-based sample sizes increase the preci-
sion of estimated effects [29, 35–37], although they also increase the likelihood of obtaining
unduly significant p-values. Accordingly, large-scale population-based studies reporting confi-
dence intervals and effect sizes stand out by the robustness of their results and the precision
of their estimates: even if their significance levels cannot be fully informative, the size of the
reported effects can offer precise estimations of the relevance of apparent differences.”
Self-report measures of empathy may be strongly influenced by gender-relevant social
norms and expectations [6, 7, 21, 23]. Indeed, self-reported empathy has been linked with
social desirability [38–40], and sex differences in such a measure correlate better with gender
roles than with biological sex [41]. As emotionality and sensitivity are both part of the
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stereotypical feminine role, women could be more willing than males to portray themselves as
empathic, even if empathic responsiveness were similar for both groups [7]. Supporting this
notion, reports on stereotypes [42, 43] show that both women and men endorse the generaliza-
tions that the former are more “sensitive to the feelings of others” and have more “emotional
insight than men”. These traditional gender stereotypes still persist, as women, relative to men,
continue to be regarded as warmer, nicer, and more sensitive, modest, and sociable than men
[44, 45]. Together with behavioral [4, 12] and physiological [6, 13, 14] empathy studies yielding
no sex-related effects, the evidence suggests that sex differences in this domain may emerge only
when gender-role stereotypes are activated by explicit self-assessment instruments [7, 10, 46].
A similar scenario concerns moral judgment. For instance, men and women have been
argued to differentially favor justice-oriented and care-oriented moral reasoning, respectively
(Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). Also, moral dilemmas have been reported to yield
more utilitarian responses in men than in women [47, 48]. However, some of these results
might also be biased by the use of self-report instruments [11].
The relationship between empathy and morality has been well established [49–53]. For
instance, empathy-related processes are thought to motivate prosocial behavior and caring for
others. Also, empathy could both provide a foundation for morality [49, 50, 52] and interfere
with morally adequate practices–for instance, by introducing partiality towards in-group
members [49]. Additional support for a link between both domains is provided by previous
studies [54, 55] showing that low empathic concern levels predict utilitarian moral judgment.
Considering these caveats, and in light of the tight links between empathy and morality, we
conducted two large population-based studies to assess whether sex differences in each domain
and in their relations prove instrument-dependent. In Study 1, we employed an experimental
empathy-for-pain task (EPT) alongside two well-known moral judgment tasks. Empathy-for-
pain paradigms reliably induce empathic responses [50, 52, 56, 57], engaging putative neural cir-
cuits [58] and triggering automatic sensorimotor resonance between other and self [59–61].
Importantly, relative to self-report instruments, these tasks can induce more automatic responses
[60, 61] which are less likely to be influenced by gender-relevant social stereotypes and expecta-
tions. Questions included in the EPT are aimed at assessing the emotional responses to others in
pain as well as aspects related to the action’s moral evaluation. This task does not include explicit
questions regarding the individuals’ empathic abilities or attitudes towards empathy. While in
self-report questionnaires individuals are asked to rate themselves on empathic behaviors and
affective responses, in the EPT they are asked to rate their emotional responses to others’ behav-
iors in different hypothetical scenarios [16–18, 62]. Questions included in the EPT are less explic-
itly associated with empathy and are therefore less likely to elicit a social desirability bias. Thus,
this instrument does not involve a self-assessment on empathic abilities, nor does it activate the
gender-role stereotype that women are more empathetic than men.
In Study 2, we aimed to (a) replicate previously reported sex differences in self-reported
empathy and (b) test whether results obtained in Study 1 were replicated when subjective data
are considered. To these ends, a subsample of the subjects from Study 1 completed a question-
naire on various aspects of empathy. Given that responses to self-report instruments are typi-
cally biased to social desirability and gender-role stereotypes, we expected sex differences to
become manifest only in this second study.
Materials and methods
Participants
Study 1 comprised 10,802 individuals (5,365 women and 5,437 men) with a mean age of 37.64
(SD = 12.51). Study 2 was based on a subsample of 334 subjects (164 women, 170 men) with a
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mean age of 46.55 (SD = 10.56). All participants were university students and professionals
possessing at least 12 years of education (see details on participants nationality in S1 Fig). Par-
ticipants were recruited via the online portal Intramed (www.intramed.net). This recruitment
procedure has been employed in several studies (e.g., [63, 64, 65]). A banner was placed in
each user’s home page, inviting visitors to voluntarily access an online survey. Participants
were excluded from analysis if they did not complete the survey. In addition, participants who
completed the entire survey in an extremely short time (less than 3 minutes) were excluded as
this suggests that they did not paid full attention to the tasks. According with the reaction
times measured in our previous studies [16–18, 62], it would be impossible for a subject to
read, understand and complete both the EPT and the moral judgment tasks in less than 3
minutes. All participants gave their informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki by pressing an “I agree” button located beneath an explanatory letter. Potential
respondents were informed of the anonymity of their responses. The Ethics Committee of the
Institute of Cognitive Neurology approved this study.
Procedure and instruments
Study 1. Participants first reported their age, gender, occupation, and country of residence
and then completed a series of tasks, as described below.
Empathy for pain was assessed with a modified version of a task previously employed in
several studies of our group [15–19, 62], which evaluates various aspects of empathy in events
involving either intentional or accidental harm. Stimuli consisted in 11 animated scenarios (4
intentional, 4 accidental, 3 neutral) featuring two individuals. Motion was implied in each sce-
nario by the successive presentation of three digital color pictures. The durations of the first,
second, and third pictures in each animation were 500, 200, and 1000 ms, respectively. In the
intentional harm scenarios, one person deliberately inflicted pain on another (e.g., by pur-
posely stepping on his/her toe). In the accidental harm scenarios, one person accidentally
inflicted pain on another (e.g., by hitting him/her with a bat). In the neutral scenarios, both
persons interacted in the absence of pain (e.g., by exchanging flowers).
Importantly, since the protagonists’ faces were not visible, facial emotional reactions were
factored out from the task. However, body expressions and postures provided sufficient infor-
mation about the victim’s emotional reaction and the agent’s intention. In this abbreviated
version, participants respond to five questions evaluating: (a) comprehension of the agent’s
intention (was the action done on purpose?), (b) empathic concern (how sad do you feel for
the victim?), (c) degree of discomfort (how upset do you feel for what happened in the situa-
tion?), (d) intention to harm (how bad was the agent’s intention?), and (e) punishment (how
much penalty does this action deserve?). Participants respond to these same five questions
after viewing each scenario. The question about purpose was answered by selecting “Yes” or
“No”. The other questions were answered using a visual analogue scale ranging from 0 to 100
–these numbers were not visible to participants. The meaning of the scale extremes depended
on the question. For example, in the question “how sad do you feel for the victim?”, one
extreme of the bar reads “I feel very sad” and the other extreme reads “I don’t feel sad at all”.
We measured accuracy for the agent’s intention question and ratings for the other questions.
Before testing, participants familiarized with the task by completing a training trial.
This task is based on the comparison of three different types of scenarios (accidental harm,
intentional harm, and neutral situations). This and similar versions of the EPT have been em-
ployed in numerous behavioral [16, 18, 62, 66] and neuroimaging [17, 50] studies in different
countries assessing clinical (e.g., [15, 16–19, 62]) and non-clinical populations (e.g., [50, 52,
58]). The ensuing results systematically show that responses to each question are modulated
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by the context in which the action occurs. Specifically, empathy ratings (i.e., empathic concern,
discomfort, intention to hurt, and punishment) are higher for intentional harm than for acci-
dental harm, and ratings for these kinds of scenarios are higher than those for neutral situa-
tions. If the format of the question may induce any response bias, this would equally affect the
three conditions. Thus, it is unlikely that differences in empathy ratings among stimulus types
are explained by biased responses.
In addition, participants were presented with two moral dilemmas [67, 68] in which they
had to choose whether they would harm one person to save another five. On the one hand, in
the standard trolley dilemma (impersonal), participants had to decide whether they would flip
a switch to redirect a trolley onto a man in order to save five other individuals. Such a choice is
considered a utilitarian response, whereas a refrain from flipping the switch is deemed non-
utilitarian. On the other hand, in footbridge dilemma (personal) participants also had the
chance to save five people, but this time by pushing a man off a bridge in order to stop a trolley
from hitting them further down the tracks. Accepting to push the man constitutes a utilitarian
response, whereas failure to do so is regarded as a non-utilitarian decision. In addition, for
comparison purposes, we included a non-moral dilemma in which participants had to choose
whether to travel by bus or train given certain time constraints.
Importantly, the level of personal engagement and the form of inflicted harm is different
in each moral dilemma: whereas the trolley dilemma proves more impersonal and less emo-
tionally salient, the footbridge dilemma involves more personal engagement and greater emo-
tionally salience [69, 70]. Also, although both moral dilemmas are logically equivalent, the
impersonal one does not require consideration of an emotion-evoking personal violation to
reach a utilitarian outcome [69, 70]. Thus, the vast majority of individuals select the utilitarian
option in the trolley dilemma and the non-utilitarian option in the footbridge dilemma [71–
73]. Finally, more than 80% of participants typically provide positive responses in the non-
moral dilemma [72].
Study 2. In addition to the measures described above, the subsample participating in
Study 2 completed a self-report questionnaire of empathy, as detailed below.
Participants completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), a 28-item self-report ques-
tionnaire that separately measures cognitive and affective components of empathy [27]. The
instrument contains four scales, each tapping a specific subdomain, namely: (a) empathic con-
cern (the tendency to experience feelings of warmth, compassion, and concern for other peo-
ple), (b) personal distress (one’s own feelings of personal unease and discomfort in reaction to
the emotions of others), (c) perspective taking (the tendency to adopt the point of view of
other people), and (d) fantasy (the tendency to imagine oneself as experiencing the feelings
and actions of fictitious characters). Each subscale has seven items measured on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 0 (“does not describe me well”) to 4 (“describes me very well”). A
total score can also calculated by adding the scores of the four subscales.
Data analysis
Study 1. Demographic and neuropsychological data were compared between samples
with ANOVA tests; categorical variables were analyzed through X2 tests. The assumption of
normality was verified using the Shapiro-Wilk test. Following previous procedures [15–18,
62], we separately analyzed the ratings for each question of the EPT using a 2 (group: female
vs. male) by 3 (stimulus type: intentional, accidental, neutral) factorial ANOVA. Tukey’s HSD
post-hoc tests were used to further scrutinize differences among stimulus type (intentional
harm, accidental harm, and neutral situations) for each rating (purpose comprehension,
empathic concern, discomfort, intention to hurt, and punishment) and significant interactions
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between group and stimulus type. Between-group differences in responses to the moral dilem-
mas and the non-moral dilemma were explored using X2 tests.
We re-analyzed the empathy data using the responses to the personal dilemma as a covari-
ate–for a similar approach see [16, 74]. Finally, we conducted multiple regression analyses to
explore whether EPT performance was explained by sex or moral judgments.
Considering our large sample sizes, between-group differences in both studies were
reported with p-values and their associated effect sizes. The statistical significance level was set
at p< .05. Effect sizes were calculated through partial eta (η2) tests. Following Cohen’s classifi-
cation of effect sizes [75], we considered effects to be statistically relevant at η2 0.01 (i.e.,
small or higher effect sizes). Effect sizes for X2 tests were calculated through Cramer’s V.
Values 0.1 (i.e., small or higher effect sizes) were considered statistically relevant [75]. More-
over, to mitigate the inflated p-value problem (characteristic of large sample sizes) and test the
consistency of sex differences across different sample sizes, all statistical analyses were also per-
formed considering the subsample reported in Study 2 (n = 334). Details of these results can be
found in S2 Text.
Study 2. Demographic data was analyzed following the same procedures as described for
Study 1. The assumption of normality was verified using the Shapiro-Wilk test. Sex differences
in self-reported empathy were tested through one-way ANOVA tests. As in Study 1, we re-ana-
lyzed self-reported empathy data using the response to the personal dilemma as covariate.
Finally, as in Study 1, we conducted multiple regression analyses to explore whether IRI scores
were explained by sex or moral judgment. For these analyses, the items yielding significant sex
differences were framed as dependent variables.
Results of Study 1
Study 1 comprised 10,802 individuals who first reported their age, gender, occupation, and
country of residence and then completed the EPT and a moral judgment task. No significant
age differences were observed between women and men (F(1, 10800) = 0.20, p = .65, η2 =
0.00001).
Empathy for pain
The five EPT measures (see methods section) revealed significant between-group differences.
These are shown in Fig 1A and detailed below. Descriptive statistical data are provided in S1
Table.
A main effect of sex emerged in intention comprehension (F(1, 10800 = 4.56, p< .05, η2 =
0.0004), with greater accuracy for women than men. We also observed a significant interaction
between sex and stimulus type (F(2, 21600 = 10.57, p< .001, η2 = 0.0009). A post-hoc analysis
(Tukey’s HSD, MS = 281.51, df = 32224) revealed that women were more accurate than men in
ascertaining the agent’s intention situations of accidental harm (p< .05).
A main effect of sex was also observed in empathic concern (F(1, 10800 = 11.88, p< .001,
η2 = 0.001), showing higher ratings in women. Moreover, a significant interaction between sex
and stimulus type emerged (F(2, 21600) = 17.50, p< .001, η2 = 0.001). A post-hoc analysis
(Tukey HSD, MS = 463.06, df = 26139) showed that women provided higher empathic concern
ratings than men for intentional harm (p< .001).
In addition, women showed higher discomfort ratings than men [main effect of sex: (F(1,
10800 = 35.93, p< .001, η2 = 0.003)]. For these ratings, we also found a significant interaction
between sex and stimulus type (F(2, 21600) = 29.50, p< .002, η2 = 0.003). A post-hoc analysis
(Tukey HSD, MS = 374.26, df = 28121) revealed higher discomfort for intentional (p< .001)
and accidental (p< .001) harm for women than men.
Sex differences in empathy
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With respect to intention to harm, there was a main affect of sex(F(1, 10800 = 3.56, p< .05,
η2 = 0.0003), showing higher ratings in women. There was also a significant interaction be-
tween sex and stimulus type (F(2, 21600) = 32.81, p< .001, η2 = 0.003). A post-hoc analysis
(Tukey’s HSD, MS = 252.28, df = 31182) showed higher intention-to-harm ratings for inten-
tional harms in women relative to men (p< .001).
Furthermore, women gave higher punishment ratings than men [main effect of sex:
(F(1, 10800 = 4.47, p< .05, η2 = 0.0004)]. A significant interaction between sex and stimulus
type (F(2, 21600 = 33.33, p< .001, η2 = 0.003) was also observed. A post-hoc analysis (Tukey’s
HSD, MS = 256.80, df = 31075) revealed higher punishment ratings for intentional harms in
women than in men (p< .001).
All data in which we found significant differences between women and men, were later
reanalyzed with Kruskal-Wallis tests. All results remained unchanged (see S1 Text).
In order to rule out trivial significant differences related to the large sample size, we re-ana-
lyzed the EPT data in the subsample of Study 2. A radically different picture emerged. There
was a main effect of sex (F(1, 332 = 6.21, p< 0.01, η2 = .001) in purpose comprehension, with
higher accuracy for women. Crucially, however, no other significant main effects of sex or
interactions between sex and stimulus type were observed for any of the remaining EPT rat-
ings (see Fig 1B). Descriptive statistical data are provided in S2 Table.
Fig 1. Significant sex differences in empathy-for-pain ratings. (A) Results from the sample of Study 1. (B) Results from the sample of Study 2. Asterisks
indicate significant differences (p < .05).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179336.g001
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In summary, women were more accurate than men in identifying the agent’s purpose in sit-
uations of accidental harm. All empathy ratings for intentional harms were higher in women
than in men. Discomfort ratings for accidental harm were also higher in women. However,
effect sizes were not even small in any of the main effects and interactions (the highest effect
size was η2 = 0.003), reducing the statistical significance and the relevance of these sex differ-
ences. In addition, and more importantly, these results were not replicated in a smaller sample
size, suggesting that significant p-values in our first analyses were inflated by the massive sam-
ple size.
Moral judgment
Impersonal dilemma. Most participants (8,586, 79.5%) delivered a utilitarian response
(i.e., yes, flip the switch), and 2,216 (20.5%) delivered a non-utilitarian response. Utilitarian
responses to this dilemma were significantly more frequent in men than in women (X2 (1) =
29.19, p< .001, Cramer’s V = 0.05), although the effect size did not even reach the minimum
criterion to be considered small (see Fig 2A).
Personal dilemma. A small proportion of participants (1,676, 15.5%) delivered a utilitar-
ian response (i.e., yes, push the man). Most of them (9,126, 84.5%) delivered a non-utilitarian
response (i.e., no, don’t push the man). Consistent with the previous analyses, utilitarian
Fig 2. Significant sex differences in responses to moral and non-moral dilemmas. Asterisks indicate significant differences (p < .05). Differences with
a small or higher effect size (Cramer’s V 0.1) are marked with a bold border.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179336.g002
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responses were significantly more frequent in men than in women (X2 (1) = 43.72, p< .001,
Cramer’s V = 0.06). Nevertheless, the effect size did not even reach the minimum criterion to
be considered small (see Fig 2A).
Non-moral dilemma. A total of 9,856 (91.2%) participants provided a positive response
to the non-moral dilemma. No significant differences were found between men and women
(X2 (1) = .16, p = .65, Cramer’s V = 0.004) (see Fig 2A).
Moral judgment data were also re-analyzed in the subsample from Study 2. Results were
similar to those reported above (see Fig 2B), although significant sex differences in utilitarian
responses to both moral dilemmas showed small effect sizes (Cramer’s V = 0.13 for both moral
dilemmas). Details are provided in S2 Text.
Re-analysis of empathy data with moral judgments as covariates
In light of the well-established relationship between empathy and morality (e.g. [49, 50–52]), we
re-analyzed the empathy data using the responses to the personal dilemma as a covariate–for a
similar approach see [16, 74]. Results showed that sex differences in comprehension of purpose
for accidental harm (F(1, 10799) = 18.08, p< .001, η2 = 0.001) remained significant after covari-
ance analysis, although a significant effect of moral judgment was observed (F(1, 10799) = 24.9,
p< .001, η2 = 0.002). Group differences in empathic concern (F(1, 10799) = 26.22, p< .001,
η2 = 0.002) and discomfort ratings (F(1, 10799) = 57.9, p< .001, η2 = 0.005) for intentional
harms remained significant after adjusting for moral judgment. Significant group differences
in discomfort ratings for accidental harm (F(1, 10799) = 18.27, p< .001, η2 = 0.001) were pre-
served, although a significant effect of moral judgment was also observed (F(1, 10799) = 19.02,
p< .001, η2 = 0.001). Moreover, significant group differences in intention to hurt (F(1, 10799) =
32.60, p< .001, η2 = 0.003) and punishment ratings (F(1, 10799) = 32.22, p< .001, η2 = 0.002)
for intentional pain situation were preserved after covariate analyses.
These covariance analyses were not performed in the subsample from Study 2 since, in that
sample, no significant interactions between sex and stimulus type were observed for any of the
EPT ratings.
Are sex or moral judgment relevant predictors of empathy for pain?
We conducted multiple regression analyses to explore whether EPT performance was
explained by sex or moral judgments. For these analyses, all measures yielding sex differences
across stimulus type were framed as dependent variables. Given that all empathy measures for
intentional harm differed among groups, we calculated a global empathy score based on the
mean of such ratings (i.e., empathic concern, discomfort, intention to hurt, and punishment).
We estimated three different multiple regression models featuring the following dependent
variables: comprehension of agent’s intention in accidental harm, global empathy score, and
discomfort ratings for accidental harm. The predictors in all regression models were sex and
responses to the personal moral dilemma.
A first multiple regression model (F(2, 10799) = 22.94, p< .01, R2 = 0.004) showed that sex
(beta = -0.04, p< .001, η2 = 0.001) and the response to the personal moral dilemma (beta =
-0.04, p< .001, η2 = 0.002) were associated with comprehension of the agent’s intention is acci-
dental harm scenarios. The second model (F(2, 10799) = 22.38, p< .01, R2 = 0.004) showed
that sex (beta = -0.06, p< .001, η2 = 0.004) was associated with the global empathy score.
Moral judgment was not a significant predictor (beta = 0.01, p = .49, η2 = 0.00004). The third
model (F(2, 10799) = 17.53, p< .001, R2 = 0.003) evidenced that sex (beta = -0.04, p< .001, η2
= 0.001) and moral judgment (beta = 0.04, p< 0.01, η2 = 0.001) were associated with discom-
fort ratings for accidental harm.
Sex differences in empathy
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We also performed multiple regression models in the subsample from Study 2. A first mul-
tiple regression model (F(2, 331) = 8.14, p< .01, R2 = 0.04), explaining 4% of the variance,
showed that the response to the personal moral dilemma (beta = -0.18, p< .01, η2 = 0.03) was
associated with comprehension of the agent’s intention in accidental harm. Sex was not signifi-
cantly associated (beta = -0.08, p = .11, η2 = 0.007). The second model (F(2, 331) = 0.77, p =
.46, R2 = 0.004) showed that neither sex (beta = -0.005, p = .91, η2 = 0.00003) nor moral judg-
ment (beta = -0.06, p = .22 η2 = 0.004) was associated with the global empathy score for inten-
tional harm. Similarly, the third model (F(2, 331) = 0.21, p = .8, R2 = 0.001) evidenced that sex
(beta = -0.03, p = .54, η2 = 0.001) and moral judgment (beta = 0.01, p = .73, η2 = 0.0003) were
not associated with discomfort ratings for accidental harm.
In addition, we performed three multiple regression analyses to explore whether sex or the
differential effect of moral judgment for personal dilemmas (the score of the personal dilemma
minus the score of the impersonal dilemma) was associated with the EPT performance. We
considered the same three dependent variables (comprehension of agent’s intention in acciden-
tal harm, global empathy score, and discomfort ratings for accidental harm). Results showed
that sex was significantly associated with all of these variables, while the differential effect of per-
sonal dilemmas was not significantly related with any of them (see details in S3 Text).
In brief, in the sample of Study 1, sex was associated with comprehension of the agent’s
intention in accidental harm, the global empathy score for intentional harm, and the discom-
fort ratings for accidental harm. The response to the personal moral dilemma was related with
intention comprehension and discomfort ratings for accidental harm. Although predictors
associated with empathy in the three models showed significant p-values, effect sizes cannot
even be considered small. Multiple regression analyses performed in the sample of Study 2
showed that sex was not significantly associated with any of the EPT measures. The response
to the personal moral dilemma was associated with global comprehension of the agent’s inten-
tion in accidental harm scenarios, but with a small effect size. Overall, regression models do
not fit the data well and predictors do not account for the variance in the dependent variables.
Neither sex nor moral judgments were good predictors of EPT based on the effect sizes and
standardized coefficients.
Discussion of Study 1
The aim of this study was to address two main issues regarding alleged sex differences in
empathy and morality: (a) the use of self-report measures which may be strongly biased by
gender-role stereotypes, and (b) the scarcity of large population-based studies reporting effect
sizes for the observed differences. To this end, we evaluated a large representative sample with
a well-validated experimental task [15–19] eliciting automatic empathic responses to others’
pain, alongside two widely used moral dilemmas [67, 68]. Based on p-values, women were
more accurate than men in ascertaining the agent’s intention during accidental harm and they
also showed higher ratings in some empathy measures. Critically, however, none of the effect
sizes reached values that could be even considered small, reducing the relevance of these sex
differences. Moreover, we found that neither sex nor moral judgments were not good predic-
tors of EPT results.
Participants in Study 1 completed an EPT, a very robust paradigm to induce empathic
responses [50, 52, 56]. Importantly, the automaticity of the reactions thus elicited [59–61] ren-
ders EPT performance impervious to gender-relevant social norms and expectations. Our
results showed that women had higher accuracy than men in comprehending the intention of
an agent inflicting accidental harm. Moreover, all empathy ratings for intentional harm were
higher in women than in men. Discomfort ratings for accidental harm were also higher in
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women. However, none of the effect sizes of main effects or interactions reached the criterion
even for small (the highest effect size was η2 = 0.003), reducing the relevance of these sex differ-
ences. In addition, we failed to replicate these results in a smaller sample size (n = 334), which
suggests that significant p-values are inflated by our large sample size. These results are consis-
tent with those of previous studies using experimental designs [4, 12] that have reported no sex
differences in empathy. Moreover, supporting our results, a previous study [76] reported no
sex differences in empathy ratings when participants viewed video clips of individuals in pain.
Finally, our results align with previous EPT research reporting no sex differences in hemody-
namic responses [6, 14], eye gaze fixations, or pupil dilation [6]. In sum, it seems that empathy
processing does not differ between sexes when assessed through instruments inducing more
automatic responses.
Conversely, our results are inconsistent with those of several studies employing self-report
measures [2–5, 20–22], which have reported greater empathy in women. It has been suggested
[6, 7, 21, 23] that self-report empathy measures are strongly influenced by gender-relevant social
norms and expectations (see below). As sensitivity and emotionality are part of the stereotypic
feminine role, it is likely that women are more willing than men to present themselves as being
empathetic, even if actual empathic responsiveness is similar between sexes [7]. Supporting our
results, previous works [7, 10, 46] have posited that enhancements of empathy in females would
be evident only when individuals are aware that they are being evaluated on an empathy-rele-
vant dimension. These kinds of measures may activate the gender-role stereotype that women
are more empathetic than men, thus increasing the levels of self-reported empathy in the former
group. Such differences are not detected with experimental measures of empathy.
Incidentally, note that these results reflect one well-known problem of the psychological lit-
erature: the low rates of replicability across studies [32, 34, 37, 77, 78]. A recent study [32]
showed that a large portion of replications did not reproduce originally reported results. This
high rate of non-replication of results is partially a consequence of the strategy of claiming con-
clusive research findings solely on the basis of single studies based on formal statistical signifi-
cance (typically a p-value of less than .05) [34]. Calculating and reporting effect sizes and
confidence intervals are highly desirable practices to relieve the lack of replicability of psycho-
logical studies [24, 26]. Using larger samples is another recommendation for increasing the
reproducibility and the precision of estimated effects [29, 35–37]. Larger samples more ac-
curately represent the characteristics of the populations from which they are derived. For
instance, the size of the confidence interval depends on the sample size and the standard devia-
tion of the study groups [25]. If the sample size is large, this leads to “more confidence” and a
narrower confidence interval. In this sense, our large-scale population-based study stands out
by the robustness of its results. Larger samples, as the one analyzed here, increase the statistical
power [34] and precision of the estimates concerning social cognitive processes.
Sex differences have also been reported in different aspects of morality [9, 47, 48, 79]. In
particular, men have been observed to differentially favor utilitarian responses to moral dilem-
mas [47, 48]. Our results corroborate this pattern for both impersonal and personal moral
dilemmas. These findings were replicated in the smaller sample of Study 2. However, these
results must be interpreted with caution due to the small effect sizes. Moreover, it is worth con-
sidering that utilitarian responses to dilemmas as the ones employed here have not shown an
association to genuine utilitarian judgments or attitudes in other contexts [80]. Future popula-
tion-based studies including larger sets of more ecological moral dilemmas should explore sex
differences to establish the meaningfulness of the present findings. In addition, utilitarian
responses to moral dilemmas have been associated with traits and attitudes (e.g., psychopathy
and rational egoism) [80, 81] that we did not assess in this study. Further research on sex dif-
ferences in moral judgment should consider these factors.
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All significant differences in empathy ratings survived covariation with responses to the
personal dilemma. Moreover, a significant effect of moral judgment was observed on the com-
prehension of the agent’s intention during accidental harm, and the discomfort ratings for
accidental harm. However, none of the effect sizes for these analyses could even be considered
small. Although these results are consistent with previous studies reporting a direct relation-
ship between empathy and morality (e.g. [49, 50–52]), the very small effect sizes dramatically
reduces their meaningfulness. Moreover, our results suggest that the relationship between
empathy and moral judgment are associated not only with crucial affective aspects of empathy
(e.g., empathic concern), but also with secondary aspects such as the comprehension of inten-
tionality behind accidental harm, and the discomfort ratings for accidental harm. Future stud-
ies should further explore the relationship between moral judgment and different aspects of
empathy.
In addition, we conducted multiple regression analyses to explore whether EPT perfor-
mance was explained by sex or moral judgment. In line with the results above, we found that
sex and the response to the personal moral dilemma were associated with the comprehension
of the agent’s intention in accidental harm and the discomfort ratings for accidental harm.
Moreover, sex was associated with the empathy global score. These results were not replicated
in Study 2. In addition, we explored whether the differential effect of moral judgment for per-
sonal dilemmas was associated with EPT performance. The results showed that this effect was
not associated with any of the dependent variables. Overall, regression models do not fit the
data well, and effect sizes and standardized coefficients showed that predictors do not account
for the variance in the dependent variables. Thus, neither sex nor moral judgments seem to be
good predictors of empathy, as assessed through the EPT.
In conclusion, although some significant sex differences emerged for the EPT in Study 1,
effect sizes were minuscule, which undermines the statistical relevance of such differences.
Hence, together with previous experimental studies [4, 12], our data indicates that sex does
not play a crucial role in empathy. Moreover, neither sex nor moral judgments appear to be
robust predictors of empathy ratings.
Results of Study 2
This study aims at testing whether results obtained in Study 1 were replicated when self-report
data are considered. To this end, a subsample of 334 individuals participating also completed a
self-report questionnaire of empathy. No significant differences were observed between
women and men in terms of age (F(1, 332) = 0.60, p = .43, η2 = 0.001).
Self-reported empathy
Women showed significantly higher IRI total scores than men (F(1, 332) = 30.27, p< .001,
η2 = 0.08). Moreover, women showed significantly higher scores than men in the subscales tap-
ping empathic concern (F(1, 332) = 5.15, p< .01, η2 = 0.002), personal distress (F(1, 332) =
22.15, p< .001, η2 = 0.06), fantasy (F(1, 332) = 14.70, p< .001, η2 = 0.04), and perspective tak-
ing (F(1, 332) = 8.56, p< .01, η2 = 0.003)–see Fig 3. Although the p-values of all comparisons
were statistically significant, effect sizes were relevant only for the total IRI score, and the per-
sonal distress and fantasy subscales.
Re-analysis of self-reported empathy data with moral judgment as
covariate
As in Study 1, we conducted multiple regression analyses to explore whether IRI scores were
explained by sex or moral judgment. For these analyses, the items yielding significant sex
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differences were framed as dependent variables. Results showed significant group differences
in the total IRI score (F(1, 331) = 29.90, p< .001, η2 = 0.08) were preserved after controlling
for moral judgment. Moreover, significant sex differences in the subscales tapping empathic
concern (F(1, 331) = 7.17, p< .01, η2 = 0.02), personal distress (F(1, 331) = 21.54, p< .001,
η2 = 0.06), fantasy (F(1, 332) = 12.83, p< .001, η2 = 0.03), and perspective taking (F(1, 332) =
8.18, p< .01, η2 = 0.02) remained significant after covariance analyses. However, a significant
effect of moral judgment (p< .001, η2 = 0.02) on empathic concern was also observed.
Are sex or moral judgment relevant predictors of self-reported empathy?
We estimated five different models in which the total score and each of the IRI subscales were
separately considered as dependent variables. The predictors in all regression models were sex
and response to the personal moral dilemma.
A first multiple regression model (F(2, 331) = 15.11, p< .001, R2 = 0.08) showed that sex
(beta = -0.29, p< .001, η2 = 0.08) was associated with the total IRI score. The personal moral
dilemma (beta = 0.009, p = .85, η2 = 0.0001) was not associated with this measure. The second
model (F(2, 331) = 7.01, p< .001, R2 = 0.04) showed that sex (beta = -0.14, p< .001, η2 = 0.02)
and moral judgment (beta = -0.16, p< .001, η2 = 0.02) were significantly associated with
empathic concern scores. The third model (F(2, 331) = 11.04, p< .001, R2 = 0.06) evidenced
that sex (beta = -0.24, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.06) was a significant predictor of personal distress
scores. Moral judgment (beta = -0.005, p = .92, η2 = 0.00003) was not a significant predictor.
The fourth model (F(2, 331) = 8.76, p> .001, R2 = 0.05) showed that sex (beta = -0.19, p =
> .001, η2 = 0.03) was significantly associated with the scores in the fantasy subscale. Moral
Fig 3. Significant sex differences in self-reported empathy. Asterisks indicate significant differences (p < .05). Differences with a small or higher effect
size (η2 0.01) are marked with a bold border.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179336.g003
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judgment (beta = -0.08, p = .09 η2 = 0.008) was not significantly associated. The last model (F
(2, 331) = 4.29, p< .05, R2 = 0.01) evidenced that sex (beta = -0.15, p< .001, η2 = 0.02) was a
significant predictor of perspective taking scores. Moral judgment (beta = -0.01, p = .8, η2 =
0.0001) was not related to scores in this subscale.
Summarizing, sex was a significant predictor of the all the IRI subscales and the instru-
ment’s total score, with small and medium effect sizes, respectively. More precisely, effect sizes
were small for empathic concern, fantasy, and perspective taking subscales, and medium for
the personal distress subscale and the total IRI score. Moral judgment was not associated with
any of the IRI scores.
Discussion of Study 2
In this study, a subsample from Study 1 also completed a self-report questionnaire tapping var-
ious dimensions of empathy. Total IRI scores were higher for women than men, and the same
was true of all the empathy subscales. Effect sizes were relevant only for the total IRI score and
the personal distress and fantasy subscales. In addition, sex was a significant predictor of the
total score and all the IRI subscales, with medium and small effect sizes, respectively. Irrelevant
sex differences observed in Study 1 were not replicated by this subjective measure. This finding
suggests that self-report empathy measures may be strongly biased by gender-relevant social
stereotypes and expectations (see General discussion).
Women exhibited higher total IRI scores than men. In turn, the latter scored higher in the
subscales tapping empathic concern, personal distress, fantasy, and perspective taking. How-
ever, effect sizes were relevant (small or higher) only for the total IRI score and the personal
distress and fantasy subscales. These results align with previous reports of higher self-reported
empathy in women (e.g., [2, 3, 4, 22, 27]). Moreover, significant differences and effect sizes
reported here are consistent with those observed in previous applications of the IRI [20, 82,
83]. As was the case in other reports [82, 83], highest effect sizes were found for the total IRI
score and the fantasy and personal distress subscales. Thus, women seem to present higher lev-
els of both cognitive and affective components of self-reported empathy. In sum, we replicated
the previously reported sex differences favoring women in self-reported empathy. However,
although such differences have been systematically detected by measuring empathy with self-
report questionnaires, it is worth noting that effect sizes reported here and in previous studies
[20, 82, 83] range from small to moderate, suggesting a limited practical relevance.
All significant differences between women and men in the IRI scores were preserved after
co-varying for moral judgment. Compatibly, multiple regression models revealed that sex was
a significant predictor of the total IRI score and the personal distress subscale with medium
effect sizes. Sex was also significantly associated with results from the empathic concern, fan-
tasy, and perspective taking subscales, with small effect sizes. In addition, moral judgment had
a significant effect on empathic concern. This finding is consistent with the results of previous
studies [54, 55] showing that utilitarian moral judgment is associated with reduced empathic
concern as measured by the IRI. Further studies should explore the relationship between utili-
tarian moral judgment and empathic concern in more population-representative samples,
including experimental measures of empathic concern and a larger set of moral dilemmas.
Unlike Study 1, the results from this self-report study showed women as more empathic
than men, with sex emerging as a significant predictor of scores on the IRI subscales. The dis-
crepancies between both studies suggest that the detection of sex differences in empathy is
strongly driven by the data collection method and associated processes involved. Whereas self-
report instruments consistently yield sex differences, experimental paradigms of empathy fail
to identify such differences.
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General discussion
Our two studies aimed to elucidate inconsistencies in the literature addressing sex differences
in empathy. In line with available evidence, Study 1 showed no meaningful differences be-
tween sexes on an experimental EPT paradigm. Conversely, in Study 2, women scored higher
than men in a self-report questionnaire of empathy. These results indicate that sex differences
in empathy are not ubiquitous; rather, they emerge mainly under specific conditions. As previ-
ously proposed [6, 7, 21, 23], differential performance in experimental empathy tasks and self-
report measures may reflect gender differences in how empathetic women and men would like
to appear. Even if there were no intrinsic sex differences in empathy levels, women might tend
to assume that they are expected to portray themselves as highly empathetic, thus favoring a
widespread gender stereotype. Instead, men could refrain from describing themselves as emo-
tional and sensitive, since this is not part of typical male stereotypes [44, 45]. Thus, questions
in self-report instruments may prompt responses influenced by the participants’ identification
with gender stereotypes [6, 7, 21, 23].
Unlike self-report questionnaires, empathic responses to others’ pain were not significantly
and reliably different between women and men. EPT relies on more automatic responses [59–
61]. These kinds of paradigms have been successful in the assessment of both healthy (e.g., [50,
52, 56, 61, 84]) and clinical (e.g., [15, 16–19, 62, 85]) populations, due to the robustness of pain
in inducing empathic responses and its capacity to engage the neural circuit of empathy [58].
Hence, EPT paradigms seem more adequate than self-report questionnaires to assess a social
complex phenomenon such as empathy.
Evidence from neuroimaging studies has shown that, at the neuroanatomical level, empathy
processes engage a broad network including the insula, the anterior cingulate cortex, the sup-
plementary motor area, the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the temporoparietal junction
[17, 50, 59–61, 86–88]. More specifically, perceiving an individual who intentionally hurts
another person triggers an early boost in the amygdala [19], which plays a critical role in evaluat-
ing actual or potential threats [89–91]. In addition, witnessing a violent conflict of two individu-
als engaged in an aggressive interaction involves the activation of a set of regions associated with
body and emotion perception, as well as social interaction [92], which includes the premotor
cortex, the extra-striate body area, the fusiform gyrus, the insula, and the amygdala. Previous
neuroimaging studies [6, 13, 14] suggest that activation of the neural network associated with
empathy does not differ between women and men. However, future studies with larger samples
should further explore whether neural correlates of empathy differ between sexes.
The relationship between empathy and morality has been well documented (e.g. [49, 50–
52]). In a similar vein, Study 1 showed a significant effect of moral judgment on the compre-
hension of an agent’s intentions and the discomfort ratings for accidental harm. Similarly,
Study 2 revealed a significant effect of moral judgment on empathic concern, but effect sizes
were very small in both cases. Further studies are needed to understand the relationship
between moral judgment and different measures of cognitive and affective empathy.
This is the first large-scale study assessing sex differences and gender roles in empathy and
moral cognition. Given that our sample size is representative of individuals in our a priori
defined population, and that our results are hence generalizable to the population addressed in
the study, the latter may be considered as population-based research [93]. Despite their contri-
butions, our studies feature some limitations. First, we assessed a population-based sample
with the EPT task, but only a subsample of these participants completed the self-report ques-
tionnaire. Further studies should assess larger representative samples with self-report instru-
ments to determine the actual impact of sex differences and their significance. Second, most
responses came from Latin American countries. Although previous studies [15–19, 54, 62, 94,
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95] have assessed Latin American populations with similar versions of the instruments
employed here, future studies with representative samples from all over the world are needed
to determine the generalizability of the present results. Third, though our findings suggest that
sex differences in self-reported empathy may be explained by the participants’ identification
with gender-role stereotypes, here we did not provide empirical support for this explanation.
Further experimental studies on empathy and its relationship with gender-role stereotypes are
needed to test this hypothesis. In addition, as we did not measure reaction times, future studies
should explore sex differences in reaction times for empathy and moral cognition tasks and
the relationship between reaction times and empathic and moral responses. Furthermore, our
results showed that utilitarian responses to both impersonal and personal moral dilemmas
were significantly more frequent in men than in women. However, given the small effect sizes,
future population-based studies including larger sets of moral dilemmas should explore sex
differences to establish the meaningfulness of these findings. Besides, further population-based
studies should examine sex differences in empathy and moral judgment combining self-report,
experimental, and neurophysiological measures to better characterize patterns of empathic
responses in each sex. Last, though challenging, future studies on sex differences should also
consider the inclusion of direct observation of empathic behaviors in order to test whether
experimental measures predict actual social behavior [96].
Conclusion
In conclusion, our results suggest that sex differences in empathy are highly dependent on the
method of assessment. Higher levels of empathy in women were detected in self-reported
empathy, while insignificant sex differences were observed in empathic responses to others’
pain. Moreover, we found that utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas were more frequent in
men than in women. However, these results must be interpreted with caution due to the small
effect sizes. These findings highlight the need for further studies on sex differences in empathy
and moral judgment, including population-based samples, multiple measures, and documen-
tation of effect sizes. Besides, future studies should control for social and cultural variables
potentially related to empathic responses and gender-role stereotypes. These considerations
may extend our knowledge of these complex social phenomena.
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